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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the district court's judgment dismissing Mr. Juan Anthony 
Jimenez's petition for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. 
B. General Course of Proceedings 
1. Underlying criminal proceedings 
The evening of September 9, 2007, witnesses observed men arguing in a Caldwell 
Maverick store. R. Vol. 2, p. 1581 (p. 147, In. 2-9); p. 171 (p. 200, In. 1-15). Witnesses then 
observed Mr. Jimenez push another person, later identified as Jay Voshall, into a sunglass display 
and then leave the store with another man. Id. at p. 158 (p. 147, In. 16-20; 148, In. 1-9); p. 162 
(p. 164, In. 18-21); p. 166 (p. 180, In. 2-7); p. 172 (p. 201, In. 12 -p. 202, In. 9). Witnesses 
thought they had just observed shoving match and nobody observed a knife. Id. at p. 158 (p. 148, 
In. 10-19); p.161 (p. 157, In. 19-24; p. 160, In. 23-25); p. 167 (p. 183, In. 17-18); p. 175 (p. 214, 
In. 6-15); p. 176 (p. 218, In. 1-4). However, Mr. Voshall indicated he had been stabbed. Id. at p. 
158 (p. 148, In. 10-19); p. 166 (p. 180, In. 8-12). Witnesses then called 911 and reported the 
license plate of the vehicle in which Mr. Jimenez and the other man had been seen getting into. 
Id. at p. 159 (p. 149, In. 1-20). 
Police located a vehicle matching the reported description, initiated a traffic stop and 
arrested the vehicle's occupants, including Mr. Jimenez. Id. at p. 194 (p. 289, In. 10-p. 291, In. 
17). At the police station, an officer noticed red stains on Mr. Jimenez's shoes. Id. at p. 198 (p. 
1 The jury trial transcript is included in the record on appeal. Citations include both the 
page number in the record and the page and line numbers in the transcript. 
308, In. 9-17). Testing showed this blood was human blood but no testing was completed to 
discover whether the blood belonged to Mr. Voshall. Id. at p. 227 (p. 424, In. 3-8); p. 229-230 
(p. 432, In. 25 - p. 433, In. 11; p. 434, In. 7-15). Moreover, police did not notice any stains on 
Mr. Jimenez's shirt, pants or hands and no weapons or visible blood were found inside the 
vehicle . Id. at p. 201 (p. 317, In. 22 - p. 318, In. 3); p. 203 (p. 328, In. 16-18); p. 221 (p. 3 97, In. 
7-12); p. 221 (p. 398, In. 20 - p. 399, In. 1). Police found a folding knife with human blood 21.9 
feet off the road a short distance from the Maverick. Id. at p. 204 (p. 329, In. 4-9); p. 205 (p. 
334, In. 3- 335, In. 17). 
Mr. Jimenez informed his trial attorney that the blood on his shoes was from a fight with 
an individual named Xavier and did not come from Mr. Voshall. R. p. 13-14, p. 53. Trial 
counsel nevertheless did not contact Xavier or consider DNA testing or other testing such as 
blood group or type to exclude Mr. Voshall as the source of the blood. R. p. 362, ~ 9(b)(viii); p. 
366, ~9; 366, ~10. Counsel also did not arrange for Mr. Jimenez to view the store surveillance 
video introduced into evidence at trial in a conference room and instead required him view that 
video through glass. R. p. 362, ~ 9(b)(iii); p. 366, ~ 12. 
At trial, Mr. Jimenez explained that he had gone inside the Maverick with his friend 
intending to get something to eat but his friend then got into a fistfight with Mr. Voshall. R. p. 
233 (p. 446, In. 11 - p. 447, In. 2). Mr. Jimenez testified that he pushed Mr. Voshall but that he 
did not have a knife and did not stab Mr. Voshall. Id. at p. 448, In. 10-25. During cross-
examination, the State asked Mr. Jimenez several specific questions about the video which he 
was unable to answer because his vision is poor. R. p. 237 (p. 461, In. 21 - p. 462, In. 1; p. 463, 
In. 22 - p. 464, In. 16); p. 238 (p. 467, In. 19-22; 468, In. 4-24); p. 239 (p. 471, In. 14 - p. 472, In. 
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14). 
During closing argument, the State admitted its case was one of circumstantial evidence 
because no one saw Mr. Jimenez with a knife but urged that a combination of the various pieces 
of the puzzle, including the blood on the shoes, demonstrated that Mr. Jimenez was guilty. R. 
Vol. 2 p. 283 (p. 10, ln. 4 - p. 12, ln. 18); p. 284 (p. 15, ln. 11 - p. 16, ln. 5). The State repeatedly 
argued that the blood being on the top of Mr. Jimenez's shoes was consistent with the stabbing. 
Id. at p. 283 (p. 12, 22-25); p. 284 (p. 14, ln. 25 - p. 15, ln. 10; p. 15, ln. 13-24); p. 287 (p. 26, ln. 
1-14); p. 289 (p. 34, ln. 6-1 O); p. 290 (p. 40, ln. 10-13). The jury found Mr. Jimenez guilty of 
aggravated battery. Id. at p. 291 (p. 44, ln. 3-16). The district court sentenced Mr. Jimenez to a 
unified term of fifteen years with a minimum period of confinement of nine years. Id. at p. 343 
(p. 63, ln. 1-10). 
2. Post-conviction proceedings 
On November 8, 2010, Mr. Jimenez filed a pro se petition and affidavit for 
post-conviction relief. R. Vol. 1, p. 4 - 57. The district court granted Mr. Jimenez's request for 
counsel and counsel amended the petition for post-conviction relief. R. Vol. 1, p. 95; R. Vol. 3, 
p. 360 - 367. Mr. Jimenez raised several claims including that counsel was ineffective for 
refusing to consider DNA testing on his shoes upon request; counsel failed to adequately show 
the surveillance video evidence to him before trial; failed to prepare Mr. Jimenez for 
cross-examination, and failed to request a lesser-included instruction or verdict form for simple 
battery. Id. After the State answered, Mr. Jimenez filed a motion requesting DNA testing of the 
blood on Mr. Jimenez's shoes and Mr. Voshall's shirt, which was denied following hearing on 
September 21, 2011. R. Vol. 3, p. 384-89; p. 392-95. 
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On October 11, 2011, the State moved to dismiss the petition for post-conviction relief. 
Id. at p. 400- 419. The district court granted the State's motion to dismiss. Id. at p. 483. The 
district court thereafter entered final judgment in favor of the State and dismissing Mr. Jimenez's 
post-conviction claims. Id. at p. 485-86. This appeal follows. 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the district court err in denying Mr. Jimenez's motion for DNA testing? 
2. Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Jimenez's petition for post-
conviction relief? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Erred in Denying Mr. Jimenez's Motion For DNA Testing by 
Concluding That it Could Only Authorize Funding For DNA Testing if He Met I.C. § 
19-4902's Specific DNA Testing Requirements, Even Where the Test Was Requested 
to Support a Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel That Was Presented in a 
Petition Timely Filed Under Section 19-4902(a) 
1. Facts in support of argument 
Mr. Jimenez informed his trial attorney that the blood on his shoes was from a fight with 
an individual named Xavier and did not come from Mr. Voshall. R. Vol. 1, p. 13-14, 53. Trial 
counsel nevertheless did not contact Xavier or consider DNA testing or other testing such as 
blood group or type. R. Vol. 3, p. 362, ,r 9(b )(viii); p. 366, ,r9; p. 366, ,r10. As a result, the State 
introduced the shoes into evidence at Mr. Jimenez's trial and argued to the jury that the blood 
came from Mr. Voshall. See R. Vol. 2, p. 212 (p. 361, In. 2-11); p. 283 (p. 12, 22-25); p. 284 (p. 
14, In. 25 - p. 15, In. 10; p. 15, In. 13-24); p. 287 (p. 26, In. 1-14); p. 289 (p. 34, In. 6-10); p. 290 
(p. 40, In. 10-13). 
In his post-conviction relief petition, Mr. Jimenez alleged that counsel was ineffective for 
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refusing to interview Xavier or request further testing of the blood on the shoes. R. Vol. 3, p. 362, 
,r 9(b)(viii); p. 366, ,r9; p. 366, ,r10. To support this claim, Mr. Jimenez filed a motion seeking 
DNA testing of the blood found on his shoes and Mr. Voshall's shirt. Id. at p. 384-88. Mr. 
Jimenez explained that the identity of the stabber was an issue at the trial because the alleged 
victim did not testify, the other witnesses did not see a knife, and there was evidence of another 
male hitting or fighting with the alleged victim immediately before the witnesses saw Mr. Jimenez 
push the victim. Id. at p. 385. Further, the prosecution used evidence of blood spots on Mr. 
Jimenez's shoes to suggest that he was the individual that actually stabbed the victim. Id. 
Mr. Jimenez further explained that law enforcement still had possession of swabs from the 
blood spots on Mr. Jimenez's shoes and Mr. Voshall's blood stained shirt, which could be 
delivered to the Idaho State Forensic Services laboratory for testing. Id. The State opposed the 
motion arguing that Mr. Jimenez's case did not meet the specific requirements for DNA testing 
under LC.§ 19-4902(b). 
At the hearing on Mr. Jimenez's motion, he explained that he was not relying on the 
specific DNA provisions pursuant to Section 19-4902 to support his request and, instead, was 
relying on the "generic section for public defenders and funding." Tr. Vol. 4, p. 1, In. 15 - p. 2, In. 
6. Mr. Jimenez also clarified that he was not seeking to test the blood found on Mr. Jimenez's 
shoes against Xavier but, rather, to compare the blood on the shoes against Mr. Voshall's. Id. at 
p. 2, In. 16- p. 3, ln. 12. Mr. Jimenez noted that the State argued to the jury that the blood on the 
shoes was from the victim and the ability to refute that inference could have changed the outcome 
of his trial where no witnesses saw a knife and there was another individual who could have 
stabbed Mr. Voshall. See id. at p. 10, In. 4 - 11, In. 7. The district court questioned whether the 
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testimony concerning the blood on the shoes could have been challenged on direct appeal2 and 
counsel clarified that Mr. Jimenez complained that he was not provided time to "actually work 
with his defense counsel to get ready for trial and that's another reason ... the DNA testing 
wasn't done." Id. at p. 11, ln. 8 - p. 12, ln. 1. The district court inquired whether Mr. Jimenez had 
authority that J.C.§ 19-861 applied rather than J.C.§ 19-4902 and Mr. Jimenez conceded Section 
4902 was: 
much more specific when it comes to post-conviction relief. But I'm in a situation 
here where J would like to get this testing done, and ... I was thinking that the 
more general section about public defender[s] might provided some basis for 
letting you give us the authority to send this evidence to the lab. 
We know the evidence exists. It's right over here at the Caldwell Police 
Department, and we just want to send it the Meridian to the Sate lab. We just 
don't have the money or the wherewithal to do it ourselves. 
Id. at p. 12, ln. 5-15. 
The district court concluded that the requirements of the Post-Conviction Act applied 
rather than the more general statements in J.C.§ 19-861. Id. at p. 12, ln. 21-25. The district court 
found that Mr. Jimenez did not meet Section 19-4902's requirements, including that the 
technology was available at the time of trial. The district court noted the typical DNA testing case 
involves a rape or homicide where the testing could exclude the defendant as the perpetrator and 
that it "sounds like you 're kind of on a fishing trip." Id. at p. 14, In. 1-7. The district court 
concluded that: 
to allow the testing, the court must find that the result of the testing has the 
scientific potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence that would show that 
it is more probable than not that the petitioner is innocent and that the testing 
2 Since trial counsel did not object to this evidence, the issue could not have been raised 
on direct appeal. 
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method requested would likely produce admissible results under the Idaho rules of 
evidence. 
Id. at p. 14,14-22; see also J.C.§ 19-4902. The district court thus denied the motion. Id. at p. 14, 
ln. 23-25. 
2. Why relief should be granted 
The specific requirements for DNA testing set forth in LC.§ 19-4902 provide an exception 
to the statute oflimitations when new scientific evidence could establish a defendant's innocence. 
Those requirements do not preclude the court from ordering testing at county expense for an 
indigent petitioner in order to obtain evidence to support a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, set forth in a timely filed post-conviction relief. Instead, Mr. Jimenez's request was 
governed by the same authority that provides for the assistance of counsel in post-conviction 
proceedings and should have been treated as an request for discovery. 
Because the district court did not apply the applicable legal standards in denying Mr. 
Jimenez's request for DNA testing, it abused its discretion in denying his motion to have the 
blood on his shoes tested against the blood on Mr. Voshall's shirt. Moreover, the DNA testing 
was necessary to protect Mr. Jimenez's substantial rights and, therefore, Mr. Jimenez was harmed 
by the district court's erroneous conclusion that he was required to meet LC.§ 19-4902's 
requirements before funding for that testing could be authorized. 
Section 19-4902 provides an exception to the statute of limitations when 
previously unavailable fingerprint or DNA testing would show a 
petitioner's innocence and does not apply to a request for DNA testing to 
support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
The post-conviction relief statute provides for two methods of initiating a post-conviction 
action. First, a petitioner may commence a proceeding by filing a verified application "at any time 
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within one (1) year from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of an 
appeal or from the determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later." LC. § 
19-4902( a). Second: 
a petitioner may, at any time, file a petition ... for the performance of fingerprint 
or [DNA] testing on evidence that was secured in relation to the trial which 
resulted in his or her conviction but which was not subject to the testing that is now 
requested because the technology for the testing was not available at the time of 
trial. 
LC.§ 19-4902(b). (emphasis added). Subsections (c) through (e) then set forth the specific 
requirements that must be met to file a petition pursuant to subsection (b ), including that "the 
result of the testing has the scientific potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence that 
would show that it is more probable than not that the petitioner is innocent." LC.§ 19-4902(c)-
(e). "The cost of the forensic DNA test shall be at the petitioner's expense, except to the extent 
the petitioner qualifies for the test at public expense pursuant to chapter 8, title 19, Idaho Code." 
LC. § 19-4902(g). 
Mr. Jimenez requested funding for DNA testing to compare the blood on his shoes with 
the blood on Mr. Voshall's shirt to support his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing 
to secure that testing at his request. Mr. Jimenez filed his post-conviction relief petition within 
the time limit set forth pursuant to Section 19-4902(a) and he was not required to meet the strict 
requirements for a petition filed under subsection (b) before being entitled to that testing. Indeed, 
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is mutually exclusive with a subsection (b) petition, 
since counsel could not possibly be deficient for failing to request a test that was not available at 
the time of trial. Accordingly, the district court erred in concluding that it could not authorize the 
requested testing unless Mr. Jimenez met the requirements for DNA testing in LC. § 19-4902. 
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b. Mr. Jimenez's request was one for discovery and he was entitled to have 
the court order payment of costs to protect his substantial rights as part of 
his right to post-conviction counsel 
Mr. Jimenez argued that the specific DNA provisions pursuant to Section 19-4902 did not 
apply to his motion and that his request was instead grounded on the "generic section for public 
defenders and funding." Tr. Vol. 4, p. 1, ln. 15 - p. 2, ln. 6. Mr. Jimenez specifically cited to LC. 
§ 19-861 ( c ), which provides that: "a defending attorney is entitled to use the same state facilities 
for the evaluation of evidence as are available to the county prosecutor." The district court 
inquired whether that section only applied in circumstances where an "office of public defender 
has been established" [ LC. § 19-861(a) & (b)] and, in any event, concluded the specific 
provisions of LC.§ 19-4902 controlled. Tr. Vol. 4, p. 11, ln. 8-18; p. 12, In. 21-25. 
Initially, while Sections 19-861(a) and (b) utilize the phrase "office of public defender," 
subsection (c) refers to a "defending attorney," which plainly has a broader application than the 
specific reference to "office of public defender." Indeed, while that term is not specifically 
defined in the existing code, it is defined in the amended version that will be effective July 2013 
as "any attorney employed by the office of public defender, contracted by the county or otherwise 
assigned to represent adults or juveniles at public expense." 2013 Idaho Laws Ch. 220 (H.B. 
147). As a contract public defender, Mr. Jimenez's post-conviction attorney was entitled to 
evaluate evidence in the same manner as the prosecutor. 
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Regardless of whether a defending attorney in a post-conviction action3 has the right to use 
the same state facilities as the State for evaluation of evidence, Mr. Jimenez correctly argued that 
the general right to a public defender provided the district court with authority to order the DNA 
testing. Pursuant to LC.§ 19-4904, the district court may order the county to pay "court costs and 
expenses of representation" when the applicant is unable to afford those costs and expenses. A 
request under LC. § 19-4904 for funds to retain an expert may be viewed as analogous to a 
request for discovery in a post-conviction action. Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 148, 139 P.3d 
741, 750 (Ct. App. 2006). A post-conviction petitioner who believes discovery is necessary for 
acquisition of evidence to support a claim for post-conviction relief must obtain authorization 
from the court to conduct discovery. LC.R. 57(b); Raudebaugh v. State, 135 Idaho 602, 605, 21 
P.3d 924, 927 (2001); Murphy, 143 Idaho at 148, 139 P.3d at 750. 
Whether to authorize discovery is a matter directed to the discretion of the trial court. 
LC.R. 57(b); Murphy, 143 Idaho at 148, 139 P.3d at 750; Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 
402, 973 P.2d 749, 754 (Ct. App. 1999). The district court is required to order discovery when it 
is "necessary to protect an applicant's substantial rights." Murphy, 143 Idaho at 148, 139 P.3d at 
750; Griffith v. State, 121 Idaho 371,375,825 P.2d 94, 98 (Ct. App. 1992). 
Here, the district court believed that it lacked the authority to order the DNA testing unless 
3 Appointment of counsel in post-conviction proceedings is governed by LC. § 19-4904 
instead ofby LC.§ 19-582. LC.§ 19-853(b), amended by 2013 Idaho Laws Ch. 220 (H.B. 147) 
("appointment of an attorney at public expense in uniform post-conviction procedure act 
proceedings shall be in accordance with section 19-4904, Idaho Code"; Charboneau v. State, 
140 Idaho 789, 792 n.l, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 n.l (2004). It is less clear whether a defending 
attorney appointed under Section 19-4904 could use state facilities under Section 19-861. 
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the specific requirements in Section 19-4902 were met. Accordingly, it abused its discretion in 
denying Mr. Jimenez's motion because it failed to perceive the issue as discretionary and failed to 
act consistently with the applicable legal standards. See Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 731, 734, 228 
P.3d 998, 1001 (20 I 0) ( describing abuse of discretion standard ofreview). 
Moreover, the State relied on the ability to infer that the blood on Mr. Jimenez's shoes 
came from Mr. V oshall to provide an important piece of the circumstantial evidence puzzle that 
led the jury to convict. The ability to test the DNA of the blood on the shoes against the blood on 
Mr. Voshall 's shirt was an essential part of establishing Mr. Jimenez's claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel for failing to obtain that testing. Accordingly, the testing was necessary to 
protect Mr. Jimenez's substantial rights and the district court should have authorized that testing. 
The UPCA provides a forum for known grievances, not an opportunity to research for 
grievances and, thus, a post-conviction action is not a vehicle for unrestrained testing or retesting 
of physical evidence introduced at the criminal trial. Murphy, 143 Idaho at 148, 139 P.3d at 750. 
However, unlike a fishing expedition, Mr. Jimenez had a very specific complaint and request. 
The district court presumed true Mr. Jimenez's averments that he told trial counsel that the blood 
on his shoes came from a fight with Xavier, which had occurred earlier on the day of the crime 
charged. R. Vol. 3, p. 466. Despite Mr. Jimenez's request, trial counsel refused to consider DNA 
testing on the shoes. The requested DNA testing would have excluded4 Mr. Voshall as the source 
of the blood on Mr. Jimenez's shoes and, thus, precluded the State from arguing that the blood 
4 While subsequent information is not relevant in this appeal, it is worth noting that Mr. 
Jimenez was able to secure testing of the shoes and Mr. Voshall's shirt in defending a federal 
criminal action in which this case was alleged as a predicate act. The FBI laboratory excluded 
Mr. Voshall as a potential contributor to the DNA found on the shoes. 
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supported Mr. Jimenez's guilt. 
While DNA testing under Section 19-4902 can only be authorized if likely to show the 
defendant's innocence, post-conviction discovery need only yield "exculpatory evidence." See 
Murphy, 143 Idaho at 148, 139 P.3d at 750. Because trial counsel failed to request the testing, 
the State was allowed to introduce the shoes into evidence and strenuously argue that the blood 
supported Mr. Jimenez's guilt. Therefore, there is a reasonable probability that preventing the 
State from arguing that the blood on Mr. Jimenez's shoes came from Mr. Voshall would have 
changed the outcome of the trial. 
In closing argument, the State admitted it did not have direct evidence that Mr. Jimenez 
stabbed Mr. Voshall and instead urged that the other evidence combined suggested Mr. Jimenez 
was guilty. R. Vol. 2 p. 283 (p. 10, ln. 4 - p. 12, ln. 18). In addition to the push and the knife 
found along side the road with blood, the State argued "Blood on Juan's shoes; not the bottom of 
the shoes, the tops of his shoes. There was testimony from the officers didn't observe any blood 
coming from Juan when he was arrested. That just adds to it." Id. (p. 12, 22-25). Later, the 
prosecutor argued that it made sense that Mr. Voshall would have bled on Mr. Jimenez's shoes 
instead of his shirt. Id. at p. 284 (p. 14, ln. 25 - p. 15, ln. 10). The prosecutor told the jury that 
when Mr. Voshall: 
bends over, being stabbed through two shirts, I would argue the only place for 
blood to exit immediately would be in a downward direction. And the blood is on 
top of Juan's shoes, not on the bottoms, not on the treads. It's on the top. 
Why wasn't there any blood on his pants. I would argue the same reasons for that. 
Why wasn't there any blood in the car when the officer searched the car? The blood was 
on top of Juan's shoes. It wasn't on the bottom of his shoes. 
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Id. (p. 15, In. 13-24). The prosecutor asked the jury to "carefully review all of the evidence ... 
look at the shoes, look at the knife, look at the photos, watch the video, study it." Id. at p. 285 (p. 
17, In. 17-25). 
In Mr. Jimenez's closing argument, defense counsel argued the blood on Mr. Jimenez's 
shoes could have come from someone other than Mr. Voshall or could have come from Mr. 
Voshall's bloody nose. Id. at p. 287 (p. 26, ln. 1-14). The State rebutted, arguing "how the heck 
did [the blood] get on Juan's shoes?" Id. at p. 289 (p. 34, ln. 6-10). Before closing, the State held 
the shoes in front of the jury, indicating "the very shoes that [the criminologist] tested. When you 
look at these, look for the stains. You'll notice they're towards the end of the shoes." Id. at p. 
290 (p. 40, ln. 10-13). 
The State not only introduced the shoes into evidence, it repeatedly relied on the blood to 
support Mr. Jimenez's guilt in closing argument. Accordingly, DNA testing of those shoes againt 
the blood on Mr. Voshall's shirt was necessary to protect his substantial right to effective 
assistance of counsel and the district court erred in denying Mr. Jimenez's motion. 
B. The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr. Jimenez's Post-Conviction 
Relief Petition Because He Presented Issues of Material Fact Entitling Him to an 
Evidentiary Hearing 
1. Pertinent legal standards 
An application for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding which is civil in nature. 
Sparks v. State, 140 Idaho 292,295, 92 P.3d 542,545 (Ct. App. 2004). Summary dismissal of a 
post-conviction action, either upon motion of the court or the state, is permissible only when the 
applicant's evidence has raised no genuine issue of material fact that, ifresolved in the applicant's 
favor, would entitle him to the requested relief. Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269,272, 61 P. 3d 
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626, 629 (Ct. App. 2002). If such a factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be 
conducted. Sparks, 140 Idaho at 295, 92 P.3d at 545. 
On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief action without an evidentiary hearing, 
the appellate court determines whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, 
depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file. State v. LePage, 138 Idaho 803, 
807, 69 P.3d 1064, 1068 (Ct. App. 2003). Moreover, the appellate court liberally construes the 
facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 272, 61 
P.3d at 629; Ricca v. State, 124 Idaho 894, 896, 865 P.2d 985, 987 (Ct. App. 1993). 
The right of a criminal defendant to counsel during trial is guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution. 
See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, (1963); Milburn v. State, 130 Idaho 649,652, 946 P.2d 
71, 74 (Ct. App. 1997). A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought 
under the post-conviction procedure act. Martinez v. State, 143 Idaho 789, 795, 152 P.3d 1237, 
1243 (Ct. App. 2007); Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 924-25, 828 P.2d 1323, 1329-30 (Ct. App. 
1992). A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel will prevail if he shows that ( 1) 
counsel's performance was deficient and, that (2) counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the 
defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
A defendant meets the deficiency prong when counsel's performance falls below an 
objective standard ofreasonableness. Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 277, 971 P.2d 727, 730 
(1998); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). As a general matter, 
this Court will not attempt to second-guess counsel's strategic and tactical choices. State v. 
Elison, 135 Idaho 546,551, 21 P.3d 483,488 (2001). Nonetheless, this rule does not apply to 
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counsel's decisions that are the result of inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or 
other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Id. The prejudice prong is met when the 
defendant shows that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of 
the proceedings would have been different. Aragon, 114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177; Mitchell, 
132 Idaho at 277, 971 P.2d at 730. 
2. The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr. Jimenez's Claim That 
He Received Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Because Counsel Refused to 
Request DNA Testing of the Blood Found on Mr. Jimenez's Shoes 
Trial counsel performed deficiently in failing to obtain further testing of the blood on Mr. 
Jimenez's shoes, even after Mr. Jimenez explained that the blood came from a fight with a person 
named Xavier. Further, such testing would have excluded Mr. Voshall as the source of that blood 
and, thus, the State would not have been able to rely on that blood to support Mr. Jimenez's 
alleged guilt. Accordingly, there is a reasonable probability that if the testing had been done, the 
outcome of the trial would have been different. 
Inadequate preparation prior to trial, including the failure to investigate material relied on 
by the prosecution, may be sufficient to show deprivation of the right to effective assistance of 
counsel. Murphy, 143 Idaho at 145-46, 139 P.3d at 747-48. The district court accepted Mr. 
Jimenez's allegation that he told trial counsel that the blood on his shoes came from a fight with 
Xavier, which had occurred earlier on the day of the crime charged. R. Vol. 3, p. 466. Trial 
counsel nonetheless failed to interview Xavier or to have any further testing conducted on the 
shoes. This complete lack of investigation was objectively unreasonable where it allowed the 
State to infer that the blood which in reality was irrelevant was a key piece of the 
circumstantial evidence supporting Mr. Jimenez's guilt. 
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The district court summarily dismissed this claim in part because the "DNA testing has not 
been performed" and it was "therefore, impossible to determine what impact DNA testing would 
have had on the verdict." R. Vol. 3, p. 460; see also p. 480 (incorporating findings from pages 
460-61 ). As discussed above, the district court abused its discretion in refusing to authorize this 
testing and thereby deprived Mr. Jimenez of essential evidence in support of his claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
The district court also found that the "DNA testing could exclude the victim as being the 
source of the blood spots on the Petitioner's shoes" but that Mr. Jimenez "has not established the 
State has DNA samples of the victim would be otherwise available." R. 458-59. This finding 
ignores post-conviction counsel's affidavit in support of the motion for DNA testing and his 
arguments in the hearing on that motion. In an affidavit, counsel explained that 
The Caldwell Police Department has in its possession certain pieces of evidence 
that can be tested to determine if the blood spots on the Petitioner's shoes match 
with the blood found on the victim's T-shirt, specifically, in connection with 
Caldwell Police Report No. 07-19198: Item #2 (T-Shirt with blood stain from 
victim, Jay Voshall); Item #27 (swab of blood sample found on defendant's right 
shoe); Item #28 (swab of blood sample found on defendant's left shoe). 
R. Vol. 3, p. 388. During the hearing, Mr. Jimenez clarified that he was not seeking to test the 
blood found on Mr. Jimenez's shoes against Xavier but, rather, to compare the blood on the shoes 
against Mr. Voshall's. Tr. Vol. 4, p. 2, ln. 16 - p. 3, In. 12. He told the district court that "We 
know the evidence exists. It's right over here at the Caldwell Police Department, and we just 
want to send it the Meridian to the Sate lab." Id. at p. 2, In. 5-15. 
Mr. Jimenez clearly established that both the blood on the shoes and Mr. Voshall's shirt 
was available for testing. The district court thus erred in finding that Mr. Jimenez had not 
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established that Mr. Vo shall' s blood was available for testing. 
Finally, Mr. Jimenez was prejudiced by counsel's failure to request the DNA testing. As 
set forth in section IV.A(2)(b), the State not only introduced the shoes into evidence but 
, repeatedly argued their significance during closing argument. Absent the ability to infer Mr. 
Voshall's blood was on Mr. Jimenez's shoes, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of 
the trial would have been different. Accordingly, the district court erred in summarily dismissing 
Mr. Jimenez's claim without ordering the requested DNA testing. 
3. The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr. Jimenez's Claim That 
He Received Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Because Counsel Did Not 
Object to Blood Test Evidence 
Mr. Jimenez claimed that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to blood test 
evidence that showed that the blood found on his shoes was human. R. Vol. 3, p. 363 ,r 9(c)(iii); 
p. 367, ,r 18. In dismissing this claim, the district court found that Mr. Jimenez did not present 
authority or evidence that certification is required to use the test utilized by the criminologist or 
that her qualifications were deficient. Id. at p. 479. 
However, counsel should have objected to the criminologist's testimony as irrelevant and 
that any relevance was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. To be admissible at trial, 
evidence must have some "tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to 
the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence." I.RE. 401. Without the ability to tie the blood on Mr. Jimenez's shoes to Mr. 
Voshall, that blood did not make it any more probable that Mr. Jimenez stabbed Mr. Voshall. 
Trial counsel thus should have moved to exclude the evidence as irrelevant. 
Even if marginally relevant, the blood evidence should have been excluded as unduly 
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prejudicial. "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." I.RE. 403. Any probative value of the blood was 
minimal where there was no evidence that the blood came from Mr. Voshall. Conversely, the jury 
was allowed to infer that blood did originate from Mr. Voshall. Such an inference was unfairly 
prejudicial. Trial counsel therefore should have objected to the evidence under Rule 403. 
Mr. Jimenez was prejudiced by counsel's failure to object to the blood evidence because it 
allowed the State to lead the jury to believe the blood came from Mr. Voshall. The exact nature 
of that prejudice is set forth above in IV.A(2)(b). The district court therefore erred in summarily 
dismissing Mr. Jimenez's petition for post-conviction relief. 
4. The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr. Jimenez's Claim That 
He Received Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Because Counsel Failed to 
Prepare Mr. Jimenez For Cross-Examination and Failed to Provide Him With 
an Opportunity to Adequately View the Surveillance Video 
Mr. Jimenez alleged that trial counsel did not prepare him for cross-examination by 
practicing any questioning or telling him what questions to expect on cross-examination. R. Vol. 
3, p.36219(c)(ii); 366 113. Mr. Jimenez also contended that trial counsel did not adequately 
show him the surveillance video by reserving a conference room and instead showed him the 
video obscured by a glass partition in the visiting room. R. Vol. 3, p. 362, 19(b)(iii); p. 366 112. 
In dismissing this claim, the district court found: 
Petitioner was questioned by his counsel about the events of the evening in 
question; the questioning was narrowly limited to the matters at issue in the case. 
Petitioner denied knowing the victim was bleeding when he left the Maverick 
store; denied having seen a weapon; denied having a weapon; and, denied having 
stabbed the victim. (Tr. Trans. p. 448, Ln.14 - 25). The scope of Petitioner's 
cross-examination was limited to the events of the evening that the Petitioner 
testified to on direct. Petitioner was asked for details about the events of the 
evening that he had testified about on direct examination. He was not asked any 
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trick questions nor was he pressed hard by the State on cross-examination. 
Petitioner's answers were evasive and he testified that he did not know or did not 
remember quite a number of details about his activities on the evening of the 
crime.(Tr. Trans. pp. 452-73). Petitioner has presented no information as to how 
his counsel could have improved his memory on such things as where they went in 
Boise, their route of travel to the Maverick store or the description of the house 
where a girl and her children joined them. Considering the testimony presented, the 
Court could reasonable infer that the jury could find the Petitioner less than a 
credible witness. 
R. Vol. 3, p. 475-76. 
These findings in essence establish why summarily dismissing Mr. Jimenez's claim was in 
error. Had counsel met with Mr. Jimenez to discuss his testimony and prepared him for the 
questions the prosecutor might have asked, the details would have been fresher in his mind and he 
would not have seemed as evasive. Further, many of the prosecutor's questions centered around 
the video of the store surveillance, which Mr. Jimenez could not view due to his poor vision. R. 
Vol. 2, p. 237 (p. 461, In. 21 - p. 462, In. 1; p. 463, In. 22 - p. 464, ln. 16); p. 238 (p. 467, ln. 19-
22; 468, In. 4-24); p. 239 (p. 471, In. 14 - p. 472, In. 14). A critical part of adequately preparing 
Mr. Jimenez to testify was allowing him to fully view this critical evidence. Instead, trial counsel 
only allowed Mr. Jimenez to view the video through a glass partition. Had Mr. Jimenez been able 
to fully view the video before his testimony, his answers on cross examination would have 
seemed far less "evasive." 
The district court found that Mr. Jimenez failed to allege that he asked his attorney to 
reserve a conference room or that an attorney room would have been available. However, that a 
request was made can be inferred from Mr. Jimenez's allegation that counsel did not reserve a 
room. Further, it is the responsibility of counsel and the detention facilities to ensure adequate 
facilities to allow clients to review the evidence against them. Denying access to contact visits so 
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attorneys can review audio and video discovery with criminal defendants would be a deprivation 
of the effective assistance of counsel. 
Trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to prepare Mr. Jimenez for cross-
examination and by failing to ensure that Mr. Jimenez had an adequate opportunity to view the 
video surveillance. Mr. Jimenez was prejudiced by that performance because he was unprepared 
for the prosecutor's questions on cross-examination and unable to answer questions about the 
video, which made him seem evasive to the jury. The district court therefore erred in summarily 
dismissing Mr. Jimenez's post-conviction relief petition. 
5. The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr. Jimenez's Claim That 
He Received Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Because Counsel Failed to 
Request a Lesser Included Instruction 
Mr. Jimenez alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial 
counsel did not ask the district court to instruct the jury that it could find him guilty of simple 
battery. Idaho Code § 19-2132(b) requires the court to instruct on a lesser included offense if: 1) 
either part requests such instruction; and, 2) there is a reasonable view of the evidence presented 
that would support a finding that the defendant committed such lesser included offense but did not 
commit the greater offense. The district court correctly found that a reasonable view of the 
evidence presented in the underlying criminal case would have supported the giving of an 
included offense instruction on battery and, thus, it would have been required to give the 
instruction ifit had been requested. R. Vol. 3, p. 477. The district court nevertheless found that: 
whether to request an included offense instruction is a matter of trial strategy and 
tactics. If the defense believes that the state's evidence is weak, the defense may 
well not request included offense instructions with the goal of achieving a straight 
acquittal. Where the state's evidence is stronger, counsel may determine it would 
be best to request any applicable included offense instructions. 
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Id. 
However, strategic or tactical decisions made by trial counsel will not be second-guessed 
on review, unless those decisions are made upon a basis of inadequate preparation, ignorance of 
the law. Further, strategic and tactical decisions should be made by defense counsel after 
consultation with the client where feasible and appropriate. ABA Criminal Justice Standards 
Standard 4- 5.2 (b ). 
Here, the decision to forego a lesser included instruction and verdict was apparently made 
without discussion with Mr. Jimenez and, thus, was based on inadequate preparation. Further, the 
State's evidence was such that giving the jury the option finding Mr. Jimenez guilty of a lesser 
included offense was critical. This is particularly true where Mr. Jimenez's testimony on his own 
behalf established that he committed a simple battery. There is a reasonable probability that the 
jury would have acquitted Mr. Jimenez of aggravated battery if given the option to find him guilty 
of simple battery and, therefore, he was prejudiced by counsel's failure to request such an 
instruction. 
Mr. Jimenez presented an issue of material fact as to whether he received ineffective 
assistance of counsel by trial counsel's failure to request a lesser included instruction. Therefore, 
the district court erred in summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Mr. Jimenez respectfully asks this Court to reverse the district court's judgment dismissing 
his post-conviction claims and to remand this case for further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted thisd)day of April, 2013. 
, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
Robyn Fyffe 
Attorney for Juan Anthony Jimenez 
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